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EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION UNDER THE
PROPOSED FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODES: SENATE
BILL 1630 AND HOUSE BILL 1647
A. Introduction
Movement once again is underway to reform the United States
criminal code.1 Current legislative efforts in this area include Senate
Bill 1630 (S. 1630),2 which recently won approval by the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary,3 and House Bill 1647 (H.R. 1647).' This
Note will analyze the extraterritorial jurisdictional provisions of
these proposed federal criminal codes, and the theoretical bases
supporting this exercise of jurisdiction.5
Extraterritorial jurisdiction, the right of the domestic court of
a State to try an individual for criminal activity that occurred out-
side the sovereign territory of that State,' is justified by, and
classified into, four major principles: 1) territorial jurisdiction, or
the right of a nation to apply its laws to activities that occur in
its sovereign territory'; 2) the protective principle of jurisdiction,
or the right of a nation to punish criminal activities that occur
outside its territory but which threaten or harm its governmental
processes'; 3) the nationality principle, or the application of a na-
tion's law to activities either perpetrated by or against its
nationals'; and 4) the universal principle, which gives all nations
18 U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
S. 1630, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
8 127 CONG. REC. S13686 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1981).
H.R. 1647, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
Other questions presented in this analysis are whether the legislature is competent
to expand jurisdiction beyond the United States borders, and whether the legislation will
infringe upon the constitutional rights of individuals tried under the extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States as established by the proposed criminal codes.
See generally Epstein, The Extraterritorial Reach of the Proposed Criminal Justice Reform
Act of 1975-S.1, 4 AM. J. CRIM. L. 275 (1976); Feinberg, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the
Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 72 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 385 (1981).
' For an excellent, general discussion of extraterritorial jurisdiction see Akehurst, Jurisdic-
tion in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 145 (1972-1973).
Territorial jurisdiction provides the justification for the exercise of jurisdiction by a
State over its ships on the high seas and over crimes committed only partly within the
prosecuting state. This latter exercise of jurisdiction is termed "objective territorial." See
I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 300-02 (3d ed. 1979).
8 Id. at 303-04.
Id. at 303.
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the right to try certain internationally condemned crimes no mat-
ter where or by whom they are committed. 0
Originally relying primarily on the territorial principle," the
United States has expanded its jurisdiction over activities com-
mitted outside its sovereign territory through the protective
principle, 2 the nationality principle, 3 and the objective territorial
principle.' Most decisions that apply United States law extrater-
ritorially are based upon an inferred legislative intent that the
applicable law was designed to apply outside the sovereign ter-
ritory of the United States. 5 Very few federal criminal statutes
currently in force deal expressly with extraterritorial application.
In contrast, the proposed criminal legislation expressly states when
extraterritorial jurisdiction exists over a particular offense.
Although the new legislation expands this jurisdiction in some
areas, it generally codifies existing United States case law deal-
ing with extraterritorial jurisdiction and eliminates the need for
the federal courts to infer legislative intent."
The proposed criminal codes represent improvements in other
areas as well. The present criminal code is comprised of a "jum-
ble" of "piecemeal" legislation 7 enacted over a period of time on
an ad hoc basis by different groups to deal with diverse problems. 8
Present law is characterized by complexity, 9 uneven application°
10 Id. at 304.
" See 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 94-95 (1968).
See, e.g., United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10-11 (2d Cir. 1968); United States
v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 216 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
11 See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421 (.1932).
" See, e.g., United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 885-86 (5th Cir. 1979); United States
v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
5 See 1 THE NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 72 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as WORKING PAPERS].
"' Feinberg, supra note 5, at 386-87.
1 Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings on S. 1630 Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 12168 (1981) (staff memorandum) [hereinafter cited
as Senate Hearings].
11 HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CRIMINAL CODE REVISION ACT OF 1980, H.R. REP. No. 1396,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 13961; Senate Hearings, supra
note 17, at 12167 (staff memorandum).
' Senate Hearings, supra note 17, at 12169 (staff memorandum). See H.R. REP. No. 1396,
supra note 18, at 4.
' "Because particular constitutional grounds for prohibiting conduct have been used for
each offense, in order to satisfy the needs perceived at the time of enactment, the present
approach also leaves irrational gaps and inconsistencies in the application of Federal criminal
laws." H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 18, at 4.
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differing judicial interpretations,21 and inaccessibility.22 Proposed
reform bills completely overhaul the existing system, setting forth
the law in a clear, comprehensive manner.23 Uniform grading of
offenses, uniform sentencing, consolidation of offenses, and consis-
tent language are the hallmarks of current legislative efforts.24
Federal criminal law reform began with the establishment of
the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws (The
Brown Commission) in 1966.1 In 1971, the Brown Commission issued
its Final Report in the form of a recommended, comprehensive
codification of the federal criminal law.2" Proposed codes based upon
the work of the Brown Commission were introduced at the 92d
Congress and successive legislative sessions,' but none have become
law, due primarily to a perceived unwarranted expansion of federal
criminal law into the province of the individual states.2" With fif-
teen years of legislative development behind it, however, and an
21 "[T]olling the statute of limitations by fleeing the jurisdiction requires an intent to
avoid prosecution in the First, Second, and Fifth Circuits. It does not in the Fourth, Eighth,
and District of Columbia Circuits." Id. at 3.
' Senate Hearings, supra note 17, at 12169 (staff memorandum).
" Id. at 12167 (staff memorandum).
2 Although H.R. 1647 and S. 1630 share these attributes, there are differences in the
scope of the two bills. The House bill is more limited in scope than the Senate bill. The
former is restricted to a reform of the substantive criminal law and sentencing pro-
cedures. The House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice decided not to revise and reform
crimes defined outside of title 18. The Subcommittee also decided to maintain the scope
of federal criminal jurisdiction at the present level absent a showing of "compelling need."
H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 18, at 9. See also id. at 11.
The Senate bill is more comprehensive in scope. "The only major areas of criminal law
not directly incorporated within the new Code are the judicially-developed laws concern-
ing generally applicable defenses to criminal conduct and the numerous regulatory statutes
that carry low levels of criminal penalties." Senate Hearings, supra note 17, at 12171-72
(staff memorandum).
z' Senate Hearings, supra note 17, at 12169.
Id.; Kennedy, Federal Criminal Code: An Overview, 47 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 451,452 (1979).
7 See H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 18, at 7-9. The most success to date by a federal
criminal code bill was in the 95th Congress, where S. 1437 was passed by the Senate by
a vote of 72-15. Congress adjourned before further action could be taken. See id. at 8.
28 Compare Quigley, The Federal Criminal Code Revision Plan: An Epitaph for the Well-
Buried Dead, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 459 (1979) (an analysis of jurisdiction under S. 1437, supra
note 27) with Pauley, An Analysis of Some Aspects of Jurisdiction under S. 1437, the Pro-
posed Federal Criminal Code, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 475 (1979) (a reply to Quigley).
Opposition was so strong in the House of Representatives during the 95th Congress
that the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice recommended against a comprehensive
code and suggested that reform be carried out through an "incremental" approach. See
H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 18, at 8.
See also 127 CONG. REC. S13659-61 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1981) (statement of Sen. Helms, incor-
porating an analysis by Nicholas E. Calio, Litigation Counsel, Washington Legal Founda-
tion) (argues S. 1630 relaxes standard and penalties for violent crimes).
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early start in both Houses, federal criminal code reform finally
may be at hand."
B. Analysis
1. Introduction
The four jurisdictional theories noted earlier all can be applied
logically to cover activity very remote from the nation asserting
jurisdiction. States are prevented from claiming jurisdiction over
activity with which they have little or no connection by customary
international law and international political realities.' Every exer-
cise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by one state infringes in one
way or another on the sovereignty of another state. Therefore,
extraterritorial jurisdiction often is asserted by governments only
after consideration of notions of international comity. 1 Comity re-
quires any extraterritorial application of domestic law to be based
upon an important domestic interest.32 The four jurisdictional
theories illustrate this point. The protective theory is based upon
the protection of governmental operations; the territorial princi-
ple concerns a nation's power over its sovereign territory; the na-
tionality principle derives from a state's power to protect and con-
trol its nationals; and the universality principle stems from the
universal condemnation of certain crimes. Considerations of com-
ity involve the balancing of these important state interests with
the competing jurisdictional interests of the state whose sover-
eignty will be infringed by the assertion of extraterritorial
jurisdiction.' Any broad expansion of United States extraterritorial
jurisdiction could draw much international criticism, and resistance
from States protesting unnecessary violations of their sovereignty.'
2. Basic Jurisdictional Framework
Under the present federal criminal code, jurisdiction is a major
element of each offense. This tends to cast more attention upon the
' See Senate Hearings, supra note 17, at 12171 (staff memorandum). For an extensive
analysis of the proposed federal criminal code, see Symposium on the Policies and Legal
Theories Underlying the Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 381
(1981). A bibliography is included. A Legal Bibliography on the Proposed Federal Criminal
Code, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 631 (1981).
o See G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 90-119 (5th ed. 1967).
" See J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 243 (6th ed. 1963).
32 See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976); BROWNLIE,
supra note 7, at 301-03.
" See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976); BROWNLIE,
supra note 7, at 301-03.
34 See, e.g., Gordon, Extraterritorial Application of United States Economic Laws: Britain
Draws the Line, 14 INT'L LAW. 151 (1980).
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jurisdictional question than the underlying criminal conduct." For
example, robbery might be defined as the taking of another's
possessions without his consent with force or a threat thereof with
the intent to cross state lines. A crime would not exist under federal
law unless there was a robbery committed "with intent to cross
state lines."3 Defining offenses in this manner on an ad hoc basis
often leads to a multiplicity of penal provisions, all dealing with
the same basic criminal conduct." One theft offense might require
a crossing of state lines. 8 Another might require a tampering with
the mails, 9 and another might involve taking money from a bank
insured by the federal government. 0 If one crime was committed
that involved all three of these offenses, the actor could be pros-
ecuted for three different crimes.
The proposed codes depart from the practice of incorporating
a jurisdictional element into each offense. The new legislation
breaks each offense into two principle subsections: 1) the defini-
tion of the criminal conduct; and 2) a description of the allegations
necessary to bring the offense within the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. The jurisdictional requirements still must be proved to a
judge or jury," but they are distinct from the underlying criminal
conduct. This method provides for a consolidation of offenses into
one section with several alternative jurisdictional bases.' The result
is clarity and simplicity in this previously troublesome area of
federal criminal law. 43
Most significantly, the new legislation states explicitly when
federal criminal law is intended to be exercised extraterritorially,"
' Senate Hearings, supra note 17, at 12174 (staff memorandum).
' "[S]everal foreign nations have refused to extradite criminals when the peculiar
American definition of such offenses comes to their attention." Id. at 12175 (staff
memorandum).
", See id.
18 U.S.C. S 2314 (1976) (transportation of stolen goods).
-, 18 U.S.C. S 2114 (1976).
, 18 U.S.C. S 2113 (1976).
" The decision to try the jurisdictional issue to a judge or jury is the defendant's option.
Senate Hearings, supra note 17, at 12175 (staff memorandum).
' A section in the Senate bill is illustrative. Section 201(b) of S. 1630 provides that "Federal
jurisdiction may be alleged as resting on more than one of such circumstances, but proof
of any such circumstance is sufficient to establish the existence of Federal jurisdiction
over the offense. Proof of more than one of such circumstances does not increase the number
of offenses that may be found to have been committed." S. 1630, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
" Senate Hearings, supra note 17, at 12175 (staff memorandum).
" WORKING PAPERS, supra note 15, at 72. "Most foreign penal codes state explicitly when
citizens may be punished for acts which they commit abroad, when resident aliens may
be punished for activity done while they are temporarily outside the forum state and when
nonresident aliens may be punished for acts done in their own country or in a third coun-
try." George, Extraterritorial Application of Penal Legislation, 64 MICH. L. REv. 609, 610-11
(1966).
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thus alleviating the courts' often difficult task of determining, from
the definition of the offense itself, the extent of extraterritorial
jurisdiction intended by Congress.'5 Under the proposed code, ex-
traterritorial application of the federal criminal laws becomes more
a question of congressional power than one of judicial
interpretation. 6
As used in the proposed codes, federal jurisdiction refers to the
nature, extent, and exercise of the power of the federal govern-
ment to make and enforce laws. 7 Both House Bill 1647 and Senate
Bill 1630 divide federal jurisdiction into three categories:48 the
general federal jurisdiction, which consists of offenses committed
within the United States that meet federal jurisdictional
requirements; 49 the special federal jurisdiction which includes (1)
real property reserved or acquired for the use of the United
States,"° (2) special maritime jurisdiction,5' and (3) special aircraft
jurisdiction; 2 and the extraterritorial federal jurisdiction. The pro-
posed codes deal with the general and special federal jurisdiction
similarly, but they differ as to extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Senate Bill 1630 lists in one section all situations in which federal
criminal law will be given extraterritorial effect.' Section 204 of
Senate Bill 1630 outlines the jurisdictional requirements for ex-
traterritorial application of the federal criminal law. Section 204
governs extraterritoriality whether or not any of the requirements
for the exercise of general federal jurisdiction have been met.'
'" WORKING PAPERS, supra note 15, at 72. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922)
(creates exception to usual presumption of territoriality in cases involving the protection
of governmental interests); Stegeman v. United States, 425 F.2d 984 (9th Cir. 1970) (bank-
ruptcy statutes serve important government interests and are an exception to the presump-
tion of territoriality of statutes); United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Cal. 1981)
(murder of Congressman in Guyana within extraterritorial jurisdiction).
' A discussion of the extent of Congressional power to provide for extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion follows infra at notes 194-244.
, H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 18, at 15.
See S. 1630 S 201(a), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 1647 S 111, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981).
- See S. 1630 S 202, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). In each offense there is a separate subsec-
tion that lists the circumstances required for federal jurisdiction. S. 1630 S 201(b)(1), 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
o S. 1630 S 203(a)(1). 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). The special jurisdiction also includes
places "purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States with the consent of the
legislature of the State in which such place is located for the construction of a building
or other facility." Id. See also H.R. 1647 S 113, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), which contains
similar provisions.
" S. 1630 S 203(b), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 1647 S 113(c), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
5 S. 1630 S 203(c), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 1647 S 113(d), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
'3 See S. 1630 S 204, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
54
IF, in a section describing an offense, there is a separate subsection in which
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House Bill 1647, on the other hand, takes a two-step approach
to extraterritoriality. One section of the House bill lists indepen-
dent bases for the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction much
like section 204 of Senate Bill 1630,11 but it is much narrower than
its counterpart in the Senate Bill. The principle method of deter-
mining extraterritoriality in House Bill 1647 lies in the descrip-
tion of each offense, with the circumstances generating such
jurisdiction listed in a separate subsection of each description."
By using this method instead of a catch-all section as is used in
Senate Bill 1630, the House bill offers increased clarification and,
as will be seen, a more limited, definable boundary governing extra-
territorial application of the federal penal laws.
Several practical difficulties immediately arise in the exercise
of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Among these are questions concern-
ing how to bring the accused before the courts, which court is the
proper one to try the case, and whether ordinary time limitations
apply to offenses committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States where there is no immediate power of enforce-
ment. Both proposed codes deal with these problems similarly.
For offenses committed within the extraterritorial jurisdiction
of the United States, venue lies in the district where the defend-
ant is arrested or is brought first after his arrest." If the defend-
ant is not arrested, an indictment may be filed in the district of
the last known residence of the defendant' or, if such residence
is unknown, in the District of Columbia.59 Under Senate Bill 1630,
the time limitation on prosecution will not run while the alleged
offender is "absent from the United States or is a fugitive."' House
one or more circumstances are specified as giving rise to federal jurisdiction over
the offense, there is federal jurisdiction over the offense ... whether or not such
a circumstance exists or has occurred if the offense is committed within the ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction of the United States to the extent applicable under sec-
tion 204.
S. 1630 S 201(b)(1)(B), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
H.R. 1647 SS 111(c)(2)-(4), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
' For example, S 1744 describes the offense of making false statements about emergen-
cies to a government agency. Subsection (b)(2) of S 1744 provides that there is extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction over this offense if the actor is a United States national and the organiza-
tion or government agency is a federal organization or government agency. H.R. 1647
S 1744, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
", S. 1630 S 3312(a)(2), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 1647 S 5904, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981).
" The indictment or information also may be filed in the district of the last known
residence of any one of two or more joint offenders. H.R. 1647 S 5904, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981); S. 1630 S 3312(a)(2), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
H.R. 1647 S 5904, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 1630 S 3312(a)(2), 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981).
" S. 1630 S 511(g), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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Bill 1647 suspends the period of limitation if the defendant is a
"fugitive from justice."'" Under either bill, simply remaining out-
side the United States for five years' after the commission of an
offense within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States
will not bar prosecution by the federal government. Both bills also
revamp the existing extradition statutes," and contain provisions
dealing both with the extradition of offenders who have fled to
the United States and the receipt of offenders from foreign nations.'
3. Jurisdiction Based Upon the Territorial and
Objective Territorial Principles.
Traditionally, the United States has based its criminal jurisdic-
tion upon the territorial principle,' 5 the idea that a state has jurisdic-
tion over crimes alleged to have been committed within its
sovereign territory." All federal criminal statutes are inherently
territorial. The territorial principle in its present form is well
recognized in international law, 7 and is the most frequently in-
voked ground for the assertion of a nation's jurisdiction.' The ter-
ritorial principle, however, gradually has been expanded over the
years. It is now deemed to justify the exercise of jurisdiction over
crimes committed within a nation's "floating territory,''69 crimes
committed only partly within the territory of the prosecuting
" "The running of a time period set by law as a bar to prosecution shall not continue
while the alleged offender is a fugitive from justice." H.R. 1647 S 703(b), 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981). The House bill suffers from some uncertainty on this issue. The Code does
not state whether an alleged offender must be a fugitive from "justice" generally or whether
he just must be a fugitive from United States "justice" in order to suspend the running
of the time limitation.
I Five years is the general time limit for prosecution of felonies and misdemeanors under
both Codes. Interestingly, the House bill explicitly exempts prosecutions for murder from
this limitation, while the Senate version exempts the prosecution of espionage. H.R. 1647
S 703, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 1630 S 511, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
See H.R. 1647, SS 5501-5515, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981)Y S. 1630, SS 3211-3218, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
" "The statutes permitting the extradition to foreign nations of criminals who have fled
to the United States are materially modernized and simplified." Sen. Hearings, supra note
17, at 12191 (staff memorandum).
65 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 11, at 94-95.
" Akehurst, supra note 6, at 152 n.1. If it is stated that a State has jurisdiction over
crimes actually committed in its territory, the guilt of the accused is prejudged. Id.
" See S. S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A., No. 9 (Judgment of Sept. 7).
" Akehurst, supra note 6, at 152.
69 "A state has jurisdiction with respect to any crime committed in whole or in part
upon a public or private ship or aircraft which has its national character." Codification
of International Law (pt. 2: Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime), 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 439,
art. 4 (Supp. 1935) [commonly referred to and hereinafter cited as Harvard Research]. The
term "floating territory" apparently was coined because this type of jurisdiction originally
applied to ships.
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nation, 0 and crimes that have an "effect" within the territory of
the prosecuting nation.71
The "special jurisdiction" of the United States stated in section
203 of Senate Bill 1630 and section 113 of House Bill 1647 represents
an extention of territorial jurisdiction beyond the real property
and airspace located within the boundaries of the United States,
to ships registered with the United States on the high seas or
elsewhere72 and aircraft belonging in whole or in part to the United
States.7" This exercise of jurisdiction derives from a rationaliza-
tion that any object flying the United States flag is subject to its
laws and therefore is considered a "floating" piece of United States
territory. The same principle can be applied to provisions in the
proposed code that confer extraterritorial jurisdiction over offenses
such as the possession of an explosive in a building in Which the
United States has an interest," the destruction" or theft77 of prop-
erty under the care, custody, or control of the United States, or
escape from" or rioting in" a federal detention facility.' In one
respect, the exercise of jurisdiction in all of the above situations
is not extra-territorial at all. The exercise of jurisdiction is
predicated upon the location of the offense, the crucial location
being property owned by, or under the control of, the United States.
The objective territorial principle of jurisdiction, an extension
of the territorial principle beyond the concept of "floating" ter-
ritory, although possibly logically consistent with territoriality, loses
70 Akehurst, supra note 6, at 152. One formulation of this type of territorial jurisdiction
requires the state asserting jurisdiction to prove that a constituent element of the offense
occurred in its territory. Id. at 152-53.
7 Id. at 153-54. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911); United States v. Fernandez,
496 F.2d 1294, 1296 (5th Cir. 1974).
7' The principle is termed the "Special Maritime Jurisdiction". in both bills. S. 1630 S
203(b), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 1647 S 113(c), 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981). This
principle is exercised by the United States and has been recognized by case law. See United
States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933). The House bill takes no chances in this area and
specially provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction over the offense of commandeering a
vessel, if the vessel is of United States registry. H.R. 1647 S 2538, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
7' This principle is termed the "Special Aircraft Jurisdiction" in both. S. 1630 S 203(c),
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 1647 S 113(d), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
" See United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933).
75 H.R. 1647 S 2721, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
70 H.R. 1647 SS 2501-2503, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
H.R. 1647 S 2531, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
78 H.R. 1647 S 1716, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
, H.R. 1647 S 2733, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
'o The territorial principle was one of the bases of jurisdiction relied upon by the Fourth
Circuit in holding that United States jurisdiction covered a murder committed by United
States Embassy personnel on the grounds of the United States Embassy located in the
New Republic of Equatorial Guinea. United States v. Erdos, 474 F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1973).
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some of that principle's facial validity. 1 The exercise of extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction by the United States over crimes that either
occur only partly with the United States or have an effect within
it82 has evoked controversy and sometimes anger from nations
deploring the exportation of United States law." The controversy
centers not so much upon the theory underlying the exercise of
jurisdiction (the theory actually is fairly well established84 ), but
rather the absence of an outer limit in the United States applica-
tion of that theory." The principle concern is that jurisdiction based
upon effects within a territory amounts to an undefinable asser-
tion of jurisdiction in that jurisdiction over an act spatially and
temporally distant from its effects may be claimed, even though
the effects may be indirect and inconsequential. This possibility
has led several writers to support limitations on the objective prin-
ciple. The suggestions range from allowing jurisdiction only by the
territory that experiences the primary effects of the offense87 to
restricting jurisdiction to the nations in which a constituent ele-
ment of the offense has occurred." A thorough discussion of these
limitations is beyond the scope of this Note; but whatever the future
of the objective theory in international law, the United States courts
definitively have recognized its validity, 9 and it is firmly entrenched
See generally Akehurst, supra note 6, at 153-54.
82 Id. at 152, 153. These two situations could overlap.
See Gordon, supra note 34 (British statutory reaction to the extraterritorial applica-
tion of United States antitrust law). The grandfather of the expansion of federal antitrust
law outside the territorial jurisdiction based upon effects within the United States is Judge
Hand's opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
Making telephone calls and sending mail to the United States has been deemed suffi-
cient to constitute conduct within the United States for purposes of jurisdiction. Leasco
Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972). The Sec-
ond Circuit has taken the position that the "detrimental effects" constitute an element
of the offense. United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1968).
For an overview of United States antitrust law and the development of its extrater-
ritorial application see Joelson, Challenges to United States Foreign Trade and Investment:
Antitrust Law Perspectives, 14 INT'L LAW. 103 (1980).
" See, e.g., Akehurst, supra note 6, at 152-54.
See Comment, Aspects of Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction in Anglo-American Prac-
tice, 11 INT'L LAW. 555, 564 (1977).
See Akehurst, supra note 6, at 153-54.
87 Id. at 154.
See id. at 152-53. Under the Harvard Research Draft Convention, territorial jurisdic-
tion would extend to: "(a) Any participation outside its territory in a crime committed
in whole or in part within its territory; and (b) Any attempt outside its territory to commit
a crime in whole or in part within its territory." Harvard Research, supra note 69, at 439,
art. 3.
See Strassheim v. Daily, 221*U.S. 280 (1911); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., Inc., 334 U.S.
280 (1952); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); Deutsche
Lufthawsa Aktiengesellschaft v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 479 F.2d 912 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES S 18 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as REST. (2d)].
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in some sections of the proposed federal criminal codes.
Section 204(g) of Senate Bill 1630 provides for extraterritorial
jurisdiction over an offense if it "causes or threatens harm, of the
type sought to be prevented by the statute describing the offense
within the United States. . . ."o The House Bill contains a similar
grant of jurisdiction,9 which covers offenses "committed" at least
partly within the United States but in which the accused par-
ticipates outside the country.92 Section 204(g) of the Senate Bill
is a direct endorsement of the controversial "effects" doctrine. The
House version appears to limit extraterritorial application of the
code with the constituent element rationale alluded to above.93
These grants of objective territorial jurisdiction place a burden
on the judiciary, which will be saddled with the responsibility of
marking an outer boundary for this expansive jurisdictional
concept. '
Both proposed codes contain sections explicitly granting extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction over offenses involving the smuggling of illegal
drugs into the United States.95 The provisions, while eliminating
some gaps in current statutory law," generally codify existing prac-
tice and case law. Jurisdiction over drug smugglers most often
is justified by the objective territorial principle,9" and is not likely
to be challenged by other nations as the trade is condoned by very
few countries.99
Closely related to, and often involved in, the drug importation
" S. 1630 S 204(gX1), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
'" H.R. 1647 S 111(c)(4)(B) provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction if the offense "is com-
mitted in whole or in part within the United States and the accused participates outside
the United States; and there is a substantial Federal interest in the investigation or
prosecution."
92 Id.
93 The Second Circuit has applied this type of interpretation. See United States v. Piz-
zarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1968).
9 The courts already have begun to place some limits on the United States application
of the objective territorial principle. See Bersh v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d
Cir. 1975) (no jurisdiction under Securities and Exchange Commission's regulation 10(b)-5
because no intention that securities be offered for sale in the United States and because
a general adverse effect on United States securities prices not a direct enough impact.
The rule was not intended to apply to this situation.); Securities and Exchange Comm'n
v. Kasser, 391 F. Supp. 1167, 1175 (D. N.J. 1975) ("Congress did not intend to confer jurisdic-
tion on the federal courts over an essentially foreign transaction .... ").
95 S. 1630 S 204(d), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 1647 SS 2711, 2712, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981).
" The courts will not have to imply extraterritorial application from a general prohibi-
tion against importation of drugs. See United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979).
17 See id.; United States v. Petrulla, 457 F. Supp. 1367 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
" Drug smuggling is analagous to the "bullet fired across the border" hypothetical, which
is a major illustration of the objective territorial principle. See Akehurst, supra note 6, at 152.
Drug smuggling sometimes is classed as an internationally condemned crime thereby
falling within the parameters of the universal principle. Id. at 161.
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offenses are conspiracy offenses, brought forward in section 204
of Senate Bill 1630 and section 111(c)(4)(A) of House Bill 1647. Pro-
viding for extraterritorial jurisdiction over attempts or conspiracies
to commit a federal offense within the United States, these sections
base their jurisdictional claim upon overt acts committed by a co-
conspirator within the United States and the intended impact of the
conspiracy in United States territory. In doing so, the sections are
amply supported by federal case law.'00 The federal antitrust laws
have been held to reach an entire conspiracy and all the par-
ticipants, "regardless of the position of any single conspirator."''
Further, a conspiracy does not have to succeed for there to be
criminal liability.' 2 Presumably, under the new codes conspirators
are within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States
if they conspire to commit a crime in the United States and any
one of them engages in any act" in furtherance of the intended
crime. '
4. Provisions Based Upon the Protective Principle
The bulk of the extraterritorial application of the federal criminal
law under the proposed codes is devoted to the protection of the
security of the United States and the protection of its governmen-
tal functions.'' Originating in continental Europe,'0 ' the exercise
of extraterritorial jurisdiction to protect governmental interests
has garnered substantial support in international law." Justice
'a "[N]o doubt that the object of the conspiracy was to violate the narcotics laws of"
the United States; that the conspiracy was carried on partly in and partly out of this coun-
try; and that overt acts were committed within the United States by co-conspirators." Rivard
v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 886 (5th Cir. 1967).
The mailing of a sample packet of cocaine to Chicago was found to be an overt act com-
mitted within the United States so as to give the United States jurisdiction over a con-
spiracy, in United States v. Schmucker-Bula, 609 F.2d 399, 402 (7th Cir. 1980).
... Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1186-87
(E.D. Pa. 1980).
,0' United States v. Schmucker-Bula, 609 F.2d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 1980).
103
Except as otherwise provided by law, if 2 or more persons, with intent that a
crime (other than an attempt) be committed, knowingly agree to engage in the
conduct that is required for the crime so intended, and any one of those persons
so agreeing intentionally engages in any conduct in furtherance of the intended
crime, each such person commits an offense one class next below the most serious
crime so intended.
H.R. 1647 S 1102(a), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Senate bill 1630 S 1002, 97th-Cong., Ist
Sess. (1981), is similar.
104 Akehurst, supra note 6, at 158. United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1968).
105 Akehurst, supra note 6, at 157.
10 The Harvard Research Draft Convention on Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime de-
scribed the protective principle of jurisdiction. Article 7 of the Draft Convention provides:
A State has jurisdiction with respect to any crime committed outside its ter-
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Marshall recognized the importance of protecting governmental
activity from criminal conduct abroad in 1804: "The authority of
a nation, within its own territory, is absolute and exclusive....
But its power to secure itself from injury may certainly be exer-
cised beyond the limits of its territory.' ' 7
The general rule that statutes are to be applied territorially in
the absence of a contrary legislative intent has been abandoned
by the federal courts when they have been confronted with an
attempted governmental exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction
based upon the protective principle:
[T]he same [territorially restrictive] rule of interpretation should
not be applied to criminal statutes . . . enacted because of the
right of the Government to defend itself against obstruction, or
fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if committed by its own
citizens, officers or agents .... [Some statutes] are such that to
limit their locus to the strictly territorial jurisdiction would be
greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute and leave
open a large immunity for frauds as easily committed by citizens
on the high seas and in foreign countries as at home.' 8
The development of the proposed criminal codes with their stress on
the protection of federal governmental interests abroad, combined with
federal case law"" and supporting language in the Restatement (Second)
of United States Foreign Relations Law," ° demonstrates United States
acceptance of the validity of the protective principle of jurisdiction and
ritory by an alien against the security, territorial integrity or political independence
of that State, provided that the act or omission which constitutes the crime was
not committed in exercise of a liberty guaranteed the alien by the law of the
place where it was committed.
Harvard Research, supra note 69, at 440, art. 7.
See also 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 11, at 94-95.
10, Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 234 (1804).
108 United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922).
"[A] country's legislature is competent to enact laws and, assuming physical power
over the defendant, its courts have jurisdiction to enforce criminal laws wherever and by
whomever the act is performed that threatens the country's security or directly interferes
with its governmental operations." United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 358
(5th Cir. 1979).
110
(1) A State has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences
to conduct outside its territory that threatens its security as a state or the opera-
tion of its governmental functions, provided the conduct is generally recognized
as a crime under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
REST. (2d) S 33, supra note 89, at 92.
Section 402 of the tentative draft of the Restatement of United States Foreign Relations
Law (Revised) provides that a state may exercise its jurisdiction over "(3) certain conduct
outside its territory by persons not its nationals which is directed against the security
of the state or certain state interests." RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES (Revised) S 402 at 98 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981) [hereinafter cited as REST. (Rev.)].
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the intent to use this principle to give United States laws extraterritorial
effect.
Section 204 of Senate Bill 1630 provides for extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion over an offense if:
(a) the offense is a crime of violence and the victim or intended
victim is -
(1) a United States official;
(2) a federal public servant outside the United States for
the purpose of performing his official duties; or
(3) a national of the United States, or an invitee of a national
of the United States, on the premises of a United States
embassy or consulate."'
Present statutory law is silent regarding jurisdiction over crimes
committed against government officials abroad." A federal district
court, however, has extended existing statutes to cover the murder
of a United States congressman in Guyana, despite the absence
of any supporting statutory language."3 Section 204(a) makes ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction explicit in these types of crimes and ap-
plies to all persons, including aliens.114 Although section 204(a)
arguably could be based upon the passive personality principle of
jurisdiction,"5 its history indicates that it is rooted in the perceived
need for protection of governmental officers or servants abroad,
not United States citizens in general."'
The exercise of jurisdiction under section 204(a)(3), which deals
with crimes of violence committed against certain persons on the
grounds of a United States embassy or consulate, may be justified
by either the protective principle or the territorial principle as
defined in section 203(a)." 7 Section 203.1. cites "real property . .
reserved or acquired for the use of the United States" as being
S. 1630 S 204(a), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
112 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 15, at 73.
1 United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
... WORKING PAPERS, supr'a note 15, at 74.
115 The passive personality principle is based upon the power of a state to protect its
nationals. Under this principle, jurisdiction is extended over all crimes that injure nationals
of the State asserting such jurisdiction. See Shachor-Landau, Extra-Territorial Penal Jurisdi-
tion and Extradition, 29 INTL & COMP. L. Q. 274, 283 (1980) and discussion infra at notes
169-93. Israel recently has asserted such jurisdiction in response to Arab terrorist activities
directed against Israelis outside of Israel. See Meron, Non-Extradition of Israeli Nationals
and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Reflections on Bill No. 1306, 13 ISRAEL L. REV. 215, 219
(1978).
116 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 15, at 74.
117 The universally recognized principle of territorial jurisdiction rests on the premise
that a state has jurisdiction over all crimes committed within its territory. Akehurst, supra
note 6, at 152 n. 1.
... S. 1630 5 203(a)(1), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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within the special jurisdiction of the United States."9 This logical
extension of the territorial principle seems to justify the exercise
of jurisdiction in these situations more appropriately, for the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction over a crime of violence committed by an
alien in which the victim is an alien invitee on the grounds of a
United States embassy could have, in some situations, a very
tenuous relationship to the protection of any legitimate federal
governmental interests.'20 Section 204(a)(3) may be somewhat
superfluous, but is doubtless intended to end any speculation con-
cerning federal jurisdiction over these crimes by providing an alter-
native justification for the extraterritorial application of the federal
criminal law.' 2'
Treason, sabotage, and espionage are three crimes that by defini-
tion are related closely to the protection of governmental activities.
Extraterritorial jurisdiction over acts of treason, based as much
upon the nationality principle 2 ' as the protective theory of
jurisdiction, 2 ' has long been exercised by the United States.24
Indeed, treason is another of the exceptions recognized by United
States courts to the usual presumption that criminal statutes only
apply territorially in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary.' 5 Section 204(b) of Senate Bill 1630 codifies existing case
law in the area in its provision for jurisdiction over acts of treason
against the United States committed abroad.
The exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over acts of sabotage
committed abroad by an alien, however, has not been exercised
commonly by the United States.2" While the Brown Commission
19 The Fourth Circuit has followed this reasoning in a 1973 case involving the murder
of a United States Embassy employee in the New Republic of Equatorial Gjpinea by the
embassy's charge d'affairs. Both men were United States citizens and the murder occurred
on embassy grounds. The court characterized the embassy as United States territory and
within the special jurisdiction of the United States as set out in 18 U.S.C. S 7(3). The court
extended jurisdiction on these grounds. United States v. Erdos, 474 F.2d 157, 159-60 (4th
Cir. 1973).
" A possible governmental interest would be the maintenance of order on embassy
grounds.
1" The new Code is seen as eliminating a gap in current jurisdiction "with regard to
diplomatic personnel who have immunity in the host country and yet cannot be prosecuted
in the United States for acts abroad .... [W]hen the crime involves only Americans, the
host nation may be reluctant to take action against the perpetrator." Strausberg, Erdos
v. United States: Expansion of Extraterritoriality and Revival of Extraterritoriality, 3 GA.
J. INT'L & Comp. L. 257, 266 (1973).
122 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 15, at 74. See infra notes 169-193 for a discussion of the
nationality principle.
'2 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 15, at 74.
12, Id.
12' "Aside from the intention of Congress expressed in the statute we are of the opinion
that the usual presumption against extraterritorial application of the criminal law does
not apply to treason." Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
12 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 15, at 74.
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was hesitant to extend jurisdiction over this crime when commit-
ted by an alien abroad, ' section 204(b) of Senate Bill 1630 pro-
vides for extraterritorial jurisdiction over acts of sabotage
regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator.12
The Senate bill does not provide for extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion under section 204 as to acts of espionage committed by aliens
outside the United States. Section 204(c)(7) provides for jurisdic-
tion over crimes that obstruct or impair a federal government func-
tion, but only if they are committed by a national or resident of
the United States.1" This is somewhat perplexing, as espionage,
like treason and sabotage, is certainly a crime aimed directly at
injuring the United States government, and is an offense the foreign
nation may have no interest in prosecuting. 3 ' Although it is possi-
ble that jurisdiction over acts of espionage committed abroad by
aliens could be inferred from other subsections of section 204,131
jurisdiction over this crime probably will continue to be conferred
by the extraterritorial application of present statutory law. 32 The
drafters of Senate Bill 1630 apparently believed that current
statutory law was adequate in this regard.1
Other offenses relating to the protection of federal governmental
functions included in section 204 of Senate Bill 1630 include:
counterfeiting or forgery of currency, passports, or other public
documents that purport to be issued by the United States; H bribery
127 Id.
1'2 S. 1630 S 204(b), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Acts of sabotage also may infringe upon
the special jurisdiction of the United States. See S. 1630 S 203(aXl), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
S. 1630 S 204(c)(7), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
'so WORKING PAPERS, supra note 15, at 74.
131 Sectikn 204(g)(1) of S. 1630 provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction over an offense
that causes or threatens the type of harm sought to be prevented by the statute within
the United States. An act of espionage committed abroad certainly would have some effect
within the United States. Conceivably, however, causing harm within the United States
is different from simply causing an effect or intending to cause an effect within the United
States. The former appears to require a more direct relationship than the latter. See S.
1630 S 204(g)(1), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
13 See 18 U.S.C. SS 793, 794 (1976); United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908
(4th Cir. 1980) (espionage conviction); Edgar & Schmidt, The Espionage Statutes and Publica-
tion of Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (1973).
1S 5 1121. Espionage
(a) Offense.-A person commits an offense if he violates-
(1) section 201 of the Espionage and Sabotage Act of 1954 (relating to gather-
ing or delivering defense information to aid a foreign government), as amended
by section 182 of the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1981 (50 U.S.C. ); or
(2) section 224(a) or 225 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2274(a)
or 2275) (relating to communication and receipt of restricted data with intent
to injure the United States or to secure an advantage to a foreign nation)....
S. 1630 S 1121(a), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
S . 1630 S 204(cXl), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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or graft involving a federal public servant;13 5 impersonation of a
federal public servant;'86 and fraud against the United States or
theft of property in which the federal government has an interest.'"
Most of these provisions are supported by United States case law'"
and general international law."39 The extension of federal jurisdic-
tion over acts of bribery committed abroad by aliens, however,
"could raise difficult questions with respect to nations in which
unauthorized payments to public officials is a societal
characteristic.""0
Section 204(c) of Senate Bill 1630 also provides for extraterritorial
jurisdiction over crimes of perjury or false swearing in a federal
official proceeding"' and making a false statement in a federal
government matter or record,"' even if committed by an alien.
Subsection (7) asserts jurisdiction over any obstruction of a federal
government function if committed by a national or resident of the
United States. By limiting jurisdiction over offenses committed
by aliens abroad to those that seriously impair official governmental
proceedings, the drafters of Senate Bill 1630 exhibit a deference
to aliens who may not be familiar with our laws relating to offenses
such as "hindering law enforcement," and refrain from unnecessarily
stretching extraterritorial jurisdiction to cover offenses having an
indirect effect, at best, on governmental functions. 4
A preoccupation with the protection of federal government ac-
tivities abroad is also evident in House Bill 1647. Paralleling sec-
tion 204(a) of Senate Bill 1630, the House bill extends extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction over particular acts or threats of violence"15
1 S. 1630 S 204(c)(4), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
" S. 1630 S 204(c)(6), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
1" S. 1630 S 204(cX5), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). See United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d
744 (9th Cir. 1973) where the court justified jurisdiction with the nationality, objective,
and protective principles over a United States citizen who had stolen federal government
property in Viet Nam.
" United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1973). The Constitution provides ex-
plicitly for the punishment of counterfeiting. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
" Harvard Research, supra note 69, at 440, arts. 7, 8.
", WORKING PAPERS, supra note 15, at 75. See also Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:
Problems of Extraterritorial Application, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689 (1979).
1 S. 1630 S 204(c)(2), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
S. 1630 S 204(c)(3), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
1,3 S. 1630 S 204(c)(7), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
1" See Akehurst, supra note 6, at 158, for examples of abuse possible when the protec-
tive principle is expanded to cover action having an indirect effect on governmental functions.
"' These acts include: murder, S 2301; maiming, S 2311; kidnapping, S 2321; terrorizing,
S 2315; robbery, S 2521; and extortion, S 2522. Jurisdiction is extended over terrorizing,
robbery, and extortion only if the person against whom the acts are directed is a federally
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directed against certain United States elected officials'46 or persons
deemed "federally protected foreign individuals." '147 A host of
sections devoted to protecting federal government functions carry
a grant of extraterritorial jurisdiction regardless of the national-
ity of the offender. This group of offenses includes: fraudulent use
of citizenship'" or passports,"4 counterfeiting, 110 forgery, 5' fraudulent
identification,'52 making false statements to the United States
government,53 tampering with federal government records,' 5 and
protected foreign individual. See SS 2315, 2521, and 2522. H.R. 1647, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981).
"' The officials included are:
a) Senators or Representatives in, or Delegates or Resident Commissioners to Congress,
or persons elected to these offices;
b) The President, President-elect, or Vice-President of the United States; or
c) "If there is no Vice President, the officer next in the order of succession to the office
of President of the United States, the Vice-President-elect or any individual who is acting
as President under the Constitution and laws of the United States." H.R. 1647 S 2301(eXIXB),
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
147
(12) "federally protected foreign individual" means-
(A) a chief of State or the political equivalent, President, Vice President, Prime
Minister, Ambassador, Foreign Minister, or other officer of Cabinet rank or above
a foreign government or the chief executive officer of an international organiza-
tion, or any individual who has previously served in such capacity, and any member
of such person's immediate family, while in the United States;
(B) a chief of State or the political equivalent, head of government, or Foreign
Minister whenever such person is in a country other than such person's own coun-
try and any member of such person's immediate family accompanying such person;
(C) any person of a foreign nationality who is duly notified to the United States
as an officer or employee of a foreign government or international organization,
and who is in the United States on official business, and any member of such
person's immediate family whose presence in the United States is in connection
with the presence of such officer or employee;
(D) any representative, officer, employee, or agent of the United States Govern-
ment, a foreign government, or international organization who at the time and
place concerned is entitled pursuant to international law to special protection
against attack upon the person, freedom, or dignity of such person and any member
of such person's immediate family then forming part of such person's household; or
(E) a citizen or national of a foreign country present in the United States as
an official guest of the Government of the United States pursuant to designation
as such by the Secretary of State. ...
H.R. 1647 S 101(12), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
Closely related to these provisions is H.R. 1647 S 1701(d)(2)(E), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981),
which provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction over any obstruction of the performance
of the protective duties of Secret Service agents, whether committed by an alien or a na-
tional of the United States.
48 H.R. 1647 S 1515, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
149 H.R. 1647 S 1516, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
110 H.R. 1647 S 2541, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
1 H.R. 1647 S 2542, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
1 H.R. 1647 S 2545, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
15 H.R. 1647 S 1742, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
'14 H.R. 1647 S 1743, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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obtaining government authorization by fraud.'1 The authority and
functions of United States officials abroad also are given protec-
tion through sections granting extraterritorial jurisdiction over
crimes ranging from the impersonation of a federal official 5 to
bribery' 1 or retaliation against a public servant.'5
Chapter 17 of House Bill 1647 provides for extraterritorial
jurisdiction over an extensive number of offenses relating to the
federal judicial processes, regardless of the nationality of the of-
fender. Hindering law enforcement,'59 misprision of a felony,6 0
witness bribery and graft, 6 ' and tampering with witnesses' repre-
sent just a few of the many offenses related to the judiciary over
which extraterritorial jurisdiction is extended.'" The House bill,
by failing to differentiate between offenses having more impor-
tant and direct effects on the judicial process and those having
only an indirect effect, goes farther in this area than the Senate
version, which limits extraterritorial application to United States
nationals whenever the offense affects federal governmental pro-
cesses only indirectly.'"
Finally, House Bill 1647 extends extraterritorial jurisdiction over
many offenses involving national defense. ' With the exception of
sabotage" and treason,"7 however, extraterritorial jurisdiction over
these crimes will be exercised only if the offense was committed
by a national of the United States.'66
5. Jurisdiction Based Upon Nationality
The power of a state to prosecute and punish its nationals is
as widely accepted in international law as is the principle of ter-
... H.R. 1647 S 1704, 97th Cong., ist Sess. (1981).
15 H.R. 1647 S 1702, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
157 H.R. 1647 S 1751, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Other sections deal with graft, S 1752;
trading in special influence, S 1754; trading in public office, S 1755; and speculating on
official action or information. See generally materials cited supra note 140.
H.R. 1647 S 1758, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
H.R. 1647 S 1711, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
H.R. 1647 S 1712, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
61 H.R. 1647 S 1721, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
182 H.R. 1647 S 1723, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
' Some other offenses included are: false implication of another, S 1714; informant bribery,
S 1722; disobeying judicial orders, S 1735; refusing to produce information, S 1733; refusing
to testify, S 1734; perjury, S 1741; failing to appear as a witness, S 1732. H.R. 1647, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
'6 See supra notes 134-144 and accompanying text.
'6 See H.R. 1647 SS 1311-1319, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Most of these sections deal
with service obligations, mutiny, or desertion.
' H.R. 1647 S 1311, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
,87 H.R. 1647 S 1301, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
H.R. 1647 SS 1311, 1315-1319, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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ritorial jurisdiction.'69 Extraterritorial jurisdiction over nationals
is exercised in varying degrees by the countries of the world; com-
mon law countries claim jurisdiction over a comparatively small
number of offenses while some continental European countries
assert jurisdiction over a very large number."7 Jurisdiction based
upon nationality has been broken down into two different theories:
jurisdiction based upon the nationality of the perpetrator, which
is commonly called the active personality principle;17 and the
passive personality principle, or jurisdiction based upon the na-
tionality of the victim.' The exercise of jurisdiction based upon
the active personality principle is rooted in the allegiance owed
by nationals to their sovereign,7 ' and is virtually unlimited so long
as there is no infringement of the rights of other nations or their
nationals."' The validity of the passive personality principle,
however, has not been established firmly in international law.'75
The United States has long exercised jurisdiction over its nationals
abroad,'76 but has done so selectively, refusing to assert jurisdic-
tion over every criminal act committed by them.'77
As stated earlier,7 ' under the proposed codes the protection of
federal governmental functions abroad is the main justification for
extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain crimes even when com-
mitted by aliens. In addition to these specific offenses, both codes
"' See Akehurst, supra note 6, at 156. Article 5 of the Draft Convention on Jurisdiction
provides:
A State has jurisdiction with respect to any crime committed outside its territory,
(a) By a natural person who was a national of that State when the crime was
committed or who is a national of that State when prosecuted or punished; or
(b) By a corporation or other juristic person which had the national character
of that State when the crime was committed.
Harvard Research, supra note 69, at 440, art. 5.
170 Akehurst, supra note 6, at 156. Israel recently has extended its jurisdiction over vir-
tually all crimes committed abroad by an Israeli national or resident. See Merron, supra
note 115; Shachor-Landau, supra note 115.
171 See, e.g., Shachor-Landau, supra note 115, at 284.
172 Id. at 283.
173 Id.; Comment, supra note 85, at 557.
17 Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 280, 285-86 (1952) (quoting Skiriotes v. Florida,
313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941)).
17s WORKING PAPERS, supra note 15, at 74.
176 See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (service of subpoena on United
States citizen residing in Paris); United States v. Lansky, 496 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1974)
(service of subpoena on United States citizen residing abroad).
177 See Akehurst, supra note 6, at 156; Blackmer v. United States, 284 US. 421, 437 (1932).
178 See supra notes 104-110 and accompanying discussion.
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contain sections that generally proscribe the obstruction of United
States governmental functions and extend extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion over these offenses if they are committed by a national. '"9 House
Bill 1647 also specifically provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction
over United States nationals in a number of offenses involving na-
tional defense."8 The nationality principle serves as a justification
for the extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction, by both proposed
codes, to cover crimes committed by federal public servants or
members of their households residing abroad because of the public
servant's official duties.'8'
The proposed codes also confer extraterritorial jurisdiction over
offenses committed by or against a national of the United States
at a place outside the jurisdiction of any nation. '82 Based upon both
the active and passive personality theories,'83 the provisions are
unlikely to be controversial given the need for jurisdiction to cover
crimes in these areas'" and the fact that such jurisdiction does
not in any way infringe upon the territorial sovereignty of other
nations. Provisions in the new codes that provide for extraterritorial
jurisdiction over offenses involving murder or other violent acts
committed against federal officials were dealt with earlier as an
exercise of the protective principle of jurisdiction but also could
be justified by the concept of passive personality. 5" The Brown
Commission chose to base this exercise of jurisdiction on the pro-
tective principle, however, because it believed the passive personal-
ity principle was of questionable validity.' 6
Senate Bill 1630 contains a surprising grant of extraterritorial
jurisdiction in sectin 204(g)(2) that is based upon the same theory
." Senate Bill 1630 S 204(c)(7) and H.R. 1647 S 1701 deal with the general obstruction
of government functions. The House bill also extends extraterritorial jurisdiction over na-
tionals under S 1744 (false statements about emergencies). S. 1630, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981); H.R. 1647, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
,B H.R. 1647 SS 1313, 1315-1319, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
S. 1630 S 204(i), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 1647 S 111(c)(3), 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981). Both provisions exclude from their coverage members of the armed forces subject
to court martial jurisdiction, and include persons accompanying the military forces of the
United States. These provisions eliminate several gaps in current law. See United States
v. Erdos, 474 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1973); supra note 121.
S. 1630 S 204(j), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 1647 S 111(cX2), 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981).
, WORKING PAPERS, supra note 15, at 76.
"4 One example is Antarctica. Id.
, See United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (murder of United States
Congressman in Guyana).
'" WORKING PAPERS, supra note 15, at 74.
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the Brown Commission was hesitant to accept fully: passive
personality.187 This section provides for extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion if:
(g) the offense causes or threatens harm, of the type sought to
be prevented by the statute describing the offense-
(2) outside the United States to-
(A) an individual who is a citizen, national, or resident
of the United States;
(B) an organization established under the laws of a
State or having its principle place of business in
in the United States; or
(C) the United States.'88
Aside from an ambiguous provision in section 205(b),19 Senate Bill
1630 apparently contains no limitations on this broad grant of
jurisdiction. The exact meaning of section 204(g)(2), however, is
unclear. A specific example may help to illustrate the problem.
Section 1721(a) of Senate Bill 1630 describes the offense of rob-
bery as taking the "property of another from the person or presence
of another by force and violence, or by threatening or placing
another person in fear that any person will imminently be sub-
jected to bodily injury." The section then lists the circumstances
required in order for there to be federal jurisdiction over this
offense. 190 Assuming none of the circumstances that give rise to
federal jurisdiction as provided by section 1721(c) exists, the ques-
tion is whether an armed robbery committed by a Mexican within
Mexico against United States citizens who are tourists there would
be within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States as
outlined in section 204(g)(2).
According to section 201(b)(1)(B) of Senate Bill 1630, the federal
jurisdiction requirements of section 1721(c) do not have to be pre-
sent in this situation. All that is necessary is a specific grant of
extraterritorial jurisdiction in section 204.1" Following the underly-
ing jurisdictional framework of Senate Bill 1630,9' that of a separa-
187 The Restatement (Second) of United States Foreign Relations Law rejected this prin-
ciple explicitly: "A state does not have jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching
legal consequences to conduct of an alien outside its territory merely on the ground that
the conduct affects one of its nationals." REST. (2d) S 30(2), supra note 89, at 86.
1S 5. 1630 S 204(g)(2), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
S . 1630 S 205 deals with the exercise of concurrent federal jurisdiction. S. 1630, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). See infra notes 231, 232 and accompanying text.
1 S. 1630 S 1721(c), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
181 The pertinent portion of S. 1630 S 201(b)(1)(B) is set out supra note 54. S. 1630, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
'" See supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
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tion of the primary offensive conduct from the circumstances giv-
ing rise to federal jurisdiction, the type of injury sought to be
prevented by section 1721 would not seem to include the federal
jurisdictional requirements of section 204(g)(2), as the scenario
presents a citizen of the United States who, outside the United
States, has suffered an injury of the type sought to be prevented
by section 1721, armed robbery. If this analysis is correct, section
204(g)(2) represents an expansive grant of jurisdiction that has lit-
tle historical support in Anglo-American law 193 and could create
serious tensions if exercised without limitation.
C. Limitations
To this point, the focus of this analysis of the proposed codes
has been their specific grants of extraterritorial jurisdiction and
the jurisdictional principles of international law that support these
grants. Underlying this analysis is the premise that the exercise
of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the United States must be in
accord with international law; that international law provides limita-
tions upon the extent to which a nation can exercise its jurisdiction.
It remains to be seen whether a domestic court would invalidate
any of the provisions in the new codes on the ground that they
violate international law. Although none of the provisions facially
appear to violate international law, broad, indiscriminate applica-
tion of some of the jurisdictional grants could raise serious ques-
tions as to their validity in particular situations.194
The general power of the federal government to legislate extra-
territorially has not, as yet, been supported concretely by any
specific provisions of the Constitution.19 5 The Constitution does con-
tain some grants of power that can have extraterritorial applica-
tion, namely: the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and
current coin of the United States,19 the definition and punishment
of piracies and felonies on the high seas and offenses against the
law of nations,19 ' the prosecution of offenses within federal
enclaves,198 and the punishment of treason.199 These specific provi-
"' This provision does find some support in the tentative draft of the Restatement (Third)
of United States Foreign Relations Law. Section 402 grants jurisdiction over "the conduct,
status, interests or relations of [a nation's] nationals outside its territory ...." REST. (Rev.)
S 402(2), s-upra note 110, at 98.
" See, e.g., Akehurst, supra note 6, at 158-59.
195 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 15, at 69.
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 6.
It U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 10.
U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 17.
19 U.S. CONST. art. III, S 3, cl. 2. See H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 18, at 15.
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sions, however, do not support all the situations in which the United
States has asserted extraterritorial jurisdiction.2"' The same can
be said of other sources of federal power, such as the right of the
United States as a sovereign nation to exercise authority over its
territories 1 or the power of the federal government to regulate
mail and commerce.02
The Brown Commission took the position that the question of
jurisdiction was linked closely to the power of the federal govern-
ment to deal with the subject matter.0 3
[Tihe question of power to reach extraterritorial crime could be
resolved as incident to the power to deal with the general sub-
ject matter without need to specify further because the Constitu-
tion speaks in terms of subject matter jurisdiction which may be
asserted.0 4
Case law appears to support this view. Without the competing in-
terest of federalism involved, the courts have found few circum-
stances that justify overriding congressional or executive policy-
making in the area of foreign affairs.s
The federal courts have acknowledged explicitly the power of
Congress to legislate concerning crimes that occur or have an ef-
fect within the United States,"8 crimes involving the protection
of the federal government, 2 and the actions and duties of citizens
abroad." Although in practically every instance in which extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction is challenged the courts seek to justify its ex-
ercise by reliance upon general international law principles,209 this
practice is a by-product of the fact that extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion seldom is conferred expressly by current law.20 Generally,
the courts will not infer extraterritorial jurisdiction, unless such
' Antitrust cases are a notable example. See Joelson, supra note 83. The constitutional
provision authorizing Congress to designate places for trials of crimes committed outside
any State also has been cited as a justification for extraterritorial jurisdiction. U.S. CONST.
art. III, S 2, cl. 3; WORKING PAPERS, supra note 15, at 69.
01 H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 18, at 15.
N2 Id.
23 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 15, at 70.
Id.; accord, Feller, Jurisdiction Over Offenses With a Foreign Element in 2 A TREATISE
ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 9-10 (M. Bassiouni and V. Nanda eds. 1973).
25 For an overview on this subject see L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITU-
TION 15-28 (1972).
Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1967).
27 United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
20 Blackmur v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932).
- See, e.g., United States v. Petrulla, 457 F. Supp. 1367, 1372 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (drug
smuggling).
210 See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 280, 285 (1952); supra note 15 and
accompanying text.
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jurisdiction can be supported by international law and it is found
that the effectiveness of the statute involved would be hampered
severely if limited to territorial application. ' The proposed codes
contain express grants of extraterritorial jurisdiction, thereby
eliminating the need to justify the inference of such jurisdiction.
Generally, inconsistency with international law will not have the
effect of invalidating domestic legislation."2 If Congress has decided
to give certain laws extraterritorial application, the courts will en-
force these laws unless certain Constitutional rights are violated. '
Therefore, any limitations constraining Congress from legislating
extraterritorially are confined to possible Constitutional due pro-
cess violations,21 the international political arena, or international
tribunals.
Limitations on the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction have
been delineated judicially due to the lack of express congressional
intent regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction under current law.2"5
The federal courts, when construing legislative intent, have held
that Congress did not confer jurisdiction on the courts over essen-
tially foreign transactions, or over situations in which the con-
tact with the United States was very remote or inconsequential." 7
Some federal courts have listed factors that should be considered
when determining whether to give certain statutes extraterritorial
effect.2"8 This jurisdictional conservatism and regard for comity" 9
21 United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922).
212
[11f Congress has expressly prescribed a rule with respect to conduct outside the
United States, even one going beyond the scope recognized by foreign relations
law, a United States court would be bound to follow the Congressional direction
unless this would violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972);
accord, United States v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 518 F. Supp. 1021, 1032 (N.D. Ohio
1981); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1178
(E.D. Pa. 1980).
"1 Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972).
214 Id.
211 See supra note 94 for cases and discussion.
216 Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Kasser, 391 F. Supp. 1167 (D. N.J. 1975).
2' Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 989 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1979).
"1' Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). Included in
the ten factors listed by the court are: the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
nationality of parties; importance of the alleged violation to the United States compared
to that abroad; possible effect upon foreign relations; and existence of an intent to cause
harm in the United States. Id. at 1297-98.
219 International comity involves:
the body of rules which reflect the recognition which one nation allows within
its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, hay-
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is by no means followed consistently in the federal courts, how-
ever.10 As these limitations grew out of the interpretational
theory surrounding extraterritorial jurisdiction, the proposed codes
would alter the courts' power in this area. Although conceivably
any grant of extraterritorial jurisdiction could be interpreted as
one that was meant to be applied conservatively, the more accurate
approach to the new codes and their explicit grants of jurisdiction
would be that any limitations intended are set out specifically. The
courts would be compelled to restrain the assertion of express ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction only in the instances and in the manner
set forth in the codes.
The need for some restraint on the extraterritorial application
of federal law is fairly evident. The prosecution for bribery of a
defendant whose culture accepts the activity as a part of normal
governmental operations, or the application of an "ignorance of
the law is no excuse" prosecution to a foreigner who knows nothing
about our legal system, are examples that not only grate upon
domestic notions of fairness but invite foreign criticism as well. 1
Also, any grant of extraterritorial jurisdiction carries with it a
problem of enforcement. Broad grants of such jurisdiction may en-
courage government officials to abduct fugitives from other coun-
tries whenever formal extradition procedures are unavailable or
otherwise considered infeasible.' Although the federal courts have
held that this type of activity violates no constitutional rights and
will not defeat jurisdiction,"' abduction is an infringement of the
sovereignty of another nation, whether they object or not. Any
legislation that would encourage this activity should be supported
by important governmental objectives.
Congressional, self-imposed restraints on extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion are manifest in section 111(c)(4) of House Bill 1647. That sec-
ing due regard both to intqrnational duty and convenience, and to the rights of
its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
Note, supra note 140, at 711 (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
' See supra note 83 for cases listed.
" See Note, supra note 140.
' Within its provisions concerning extradition, the House bill has a section setting out
procedures for provisional arrests and detention within the extraterritorial jurisdiction.
H.R. 1647 S 5507, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
' See United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975); United States
v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1973). Compare with United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d
267 (2d Cir. 1974).
This area of the law has an extensive history beginning primarily with Frisbie v. Col-
lins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
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tion gives a broad grant of objective territorial type jurisdiction
if "there is a substantial Federal interest in the investigation or
prosecution" of the offense.' The House Report defines a substan-
tial federal interest as existing when an offense causes or threatens
harm of the type sought to be prevented by the statute in the
United States, to a citizen, national, or resident of the United States,
to an organization organized in the United States or having its
principal place of business there, or to the United States. 5 In any
application of extraterritorial jurisdiction under section 111(c)(4),
a federal agency would make an initial determination of whether
there existed a substantial federal interest in prosecution of the
crime."6 If the case is prosecuted and the existence of a substan-
tial interest is contested, the court will decide the issue based upon
comity' and the importance of the interest sought to be protected
by the United States. 28 This requirement of a substantial interest
is consistent with the statutes of other nations,2" and should help
mollify criticism that the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction
by the United States is insensitive to international law.
The Senate bill, on the other hand, contains no explicit limita-
tions upon its jurisdictional grants, not even on section 204(g)(2),
which represents an expansive, radical departure from past case
law.23 Section 205(b) of Senate Bill 1630231 sets out the requirement
of a substantial federal interest in a federal prosecution under the
new code, but appears more concerned with federal as opposed
to state jurisdiction than with federal as compared to foreign jur-
isdiction. 2 Section 205(b) makes no mention of the impact of the
crime, but deals in terms of the ability of one jurisdiction or the
other to prosecute it. If section 205(b) is not meant to limit section
204, the bill, through silence, has precluded considerations of in-
ternational comity from the jurisdictional question and has charted
rigidly the course it intends the courts to follow. Any limitations
2 H.R. 1647 S 111(c)(4), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
21 H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 18, at 23. This language is practically identical to the
grant of jurisdiction in S. 1630 S 204(g), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
2, H.R. REP. No. 1396, suprd note 18, at 22.
See supra notes 218-219 for discussion.
"8 H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 18, at 22-23.
See Taylor, The Extraterritoriality of the Australian Antitrust Law, 13 J. INT'L L.
& ECON. 273, 274 (1979).
m See supra notes 187-193 and accompanying text.
m' S. 1630 S 205, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (deals with the exercise of concurrent
jurisdiction).
' See S. 1630 SS 205(b)(1-6), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Senate Hearings, supra note
17, at 12176 (staff memorandum).
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on the grants of extraterritorial jurisdiction under Senate Bill 1630
therefore, will be construed by the judiciary and subject to charges
of judicial legislation.
The United States Constitution also may provide some limita-
tions on extraterritorial jurisdiction. Any extraterritorial applica-
tion of the federal penal laws that violates due process will be
struck down by the courts.m Extraterritorial jurisdiction is con-
stitutionally suspect in two basic areas: possible double jeopardy
violations, and the lack of compulsory process.
The constitutional prohibition against twice being put in jeopardy
of life and limb for the same offense' has been held not to apply
to prosecutions for the same crime initiated by different
sovereigns.23 5 It seems inherently unfair, however, to assert that
a defendant who has served ten years imprisonment in Mexico for
attempting to smuggle drugs into the United States will be sub-
ject to similar punishment if he ever enters the United States.
This harsh result may be offset at times by extradition treaties
that contain double jeopardy provisions. 236 The House bill contains
a double jeopardy provision relating to defendants transferred 237
to the United States from a foreign country." Also, if the time
limitations on the prosecution of an offense are not suspended while
the defendant is serving time in a foreign jurisdiction, a long
sentence could serve to preclude a United States court from pros-
ecuting him again.239
The possibility that a defendant will be unable to secure com-
pulsory process to obtain witnesses in his favor increases when
the crime for which he is charged was committed extraterritorially.
Although it has been held that the sixth amendment right to com-
pulsory process can exist only where it is within the power of the
government to provide it,240 it is conceivable that a defendant could
justify a dismissal of the charges against him because he cannot
summon the witnesses he needs for his defense. The absence of
Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972).
2M U.S. CONST. amend. V.
m United States v. Richardson, 580 F.2d 946, 947 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1068. See also Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (deals expressly with due process
clause of fourteenth amendment).
See Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1980) (extradition treaty with Italy).
" [Transfer' means a transfer of an individual for the purpose of the execution in
one country of a sentence imposed by the courts of another country." H.R. 1647 S 5556(9),
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
H.R. 1647 S 5551, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
- See H.R. 1647 S 703(b), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); discussion supra note 61.
- United States v. Greco, 298 F.2d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 1962).
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the right of compulsory process alone will not result in a dismissal;"
but, if its denial results in an inability to present a defense,242 which
lies at the very heart of the right,243 notions of due process may
justify bringing an end to the prosecution.2"
D. Conclusion
The extraterritorial jurisdictional provisions in the proposed
federal criminal codes represent a substantial clarification of United
States law in this area. Senate Bill 1630, by using one section to
list all the instances of extraterritorial application of the federal
criminal law, brings some coherence to United States jurisdictional
philosophy. Broad, general provisions, however, invite interpreta-
tion and clarification by the courts, creating the possibility of unan-
ticipated extraterritorial application of the federal penal laws.
House Bill 1647, on the other hand, offers certainty of application
by virtue of its inclusion of jurisdictional provisions within the
description of each offense. Tailoring and scattering the jurisdic-
tional provisions in this manner, however, makes it more difficult
to discern any pattern to federal law in this field. Finally, the House
bill explicitly provides for considerations of comity to enter the
decision whether to apply federal law extraterritorially, while the
Senate version apparently locks all such discretion into its black
letter statutory rules.
Although the proposed codes generally trace present case law
and contain no radical departures from commonly accepted inter-
241 Id.; Johnson v. Johnson, 375 F. Supp. 872, 876 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
242 "The most important consideration is that the defendants were effectively denied
the opportunity to present their only defense." Johnson v. Johnson, 375 F. Supp. 872, 876
(W.D. Mich. 1974).
243
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance,
if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present
the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so
it may decide where the truth lies.
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
' "The Fourteenth Amendment's grant of a right to due process of law guarantees at
a minimum a fair trial in every criminal prosecution." Johnson v. Johnson, 375 F. Supp.
872. 875 (W.D. Mich. 1974). This same reasoning undoubtedly would apply to fifth amend-
ment due process as well.
The district court in Johnson v. Johnson did not go so far as the text suggests.
This is not to say that the defendants had a right to an outright dismissal because
some of their witnesses could not be obtained. Nor did the defendants have a
right to a prolonged delay. But the crucial right to present a defense as com-
prehended by the Sixth Amendment required something more than what was
done here.
Id. at 876.
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national law principles, they do expand the extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States in a few areas. Whether passed or not,
the codes emphasize a trend in United States law, which evidences
an unwillingness to trust other nations with the punishment of
crimes that affect United States interests.
William A. Gillon
